employee
Russian Federation
UDC 167
UDC 004.8
The author considers the reason for the difficulties in solving the question of the artificial intelligence ontological status, which is caused by lacunas in the problem statement of the human consciousness nature. It is suggested to limit the discussion of the interpretation of human consciousness by the methodological framework of pragmatism, the feasibility of such a restriction has been demonstrated. The author relies on modern physicalism, as well as on the information approach of D. I. Dubrovsky, taking them as the basis of a minimal theory of consciousness, and believes that the pragmatist framework will allow excluding a number of speculative judgments from the definition of the artificial intelligence ontological status.
artificial intelligence, ontological status, pragmatism, scientific methodology, philosophy of consciousness, physicalism, information approach
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