employee
Russian Federation
UDC 165.0
UDC 17.03
UDC 004.8
The “new ethics” of artificial intelligence proposed by M. Gabriel is critically evaluated. It is argued that, unlike human intelligence, artificial intelligence is devoid of normative dimension, or, equivalently, context sensitivity. The author shows the contradiction between M. Gabriel’s viewpoint and J. Benoist’s realistic contextual approach to ethics, and T. Williamson’s moral realism, according to which it is not principles that are primary, but moral perception in context, paradigmatic examples of moral knowledge. Approaches to artificial intelligence understanding by M. Gabriel, D. Andler, L. Floridi, and S. Russell are compared. The feasibility of D. Andler’s moderation principle has been proved. The realistic concept of artificial intelligence (AI) is opposed to the idealistic concept.
artificial intelligence, AI ethics, Gabriel, moral progress, autonomy, context, normativity, moral realism, moderation principle
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